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3 Institutional Amnesia and Humanitarian Disaster Management
Institutional amnesia is a serious concern for those who plan for, respond to and 
recover from humanitarian crises. Yet little effort has been made to understand its 
effects in disaster management generally and humanitarian agencies specifically. 
Consequently, we have no idea how to reform in ways which can deal with the issue of 
memory-loss. This paper addresses these concerns by defining institutional amnesia 
in conceptual and empirical terms, establishing its causes in the humanitarian policy 
space, ascertaining its effects within and across disasters and, most importantly, set-
ting out a series of recommendations that can help humanitarian agencies address 
their own amnesia. The central argument is that institutional memory-loss is robbing 
individuals, organisations and networks of their lesson-learning gains. This is the sin-
gle biggest reason why memory-loss must be acknowledged and treated as matter of 
some urgency.
ABSTRACT
4 Institutional Amnesia and Humanitarian Disaster Management
However, memory is also retained within organisations. 
This is done through a variety of methods. The first and 
most obvious way is via record-keeping. Over the past 
twenty years, changes in the ways in which public sector 
agencies record data (as more formal records give way 
to digital and internet based archiving) and changes in 
the nature and location of decision making (as formal ‘on 
the record’ styles of decision making give way to a more 
informal styles) have both led to the loss of a great deal 
of institutional memory (Pollitt 2000; 2009). Amnesia 
can therefore be understood through weaknesses in 
the quality of those processes that archive the past and 
allow staff to access historical lessons.
A second less obvious manifestation of organisational 
memory can be seen in the accumulation of standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) that institutionalise 
historical lessons. These are often the result of internal 
lesson-learning efforts that have identified issues and 
put in place reforms. Another dimension of institutional 
amnesia can therefore be measured in the decline or 
abandonment of procedures. This type of amnesia 
often occurs when no-one can remember why those 
procedures exist (Walsh and Ungson 1991; Stark 2019), 
which can happen if reforms in an organisation capture 
the lessons from the past but not necessarily the details 
of history (March and Levitt 1988). A failed operational 
response to a disaster, for example, may teach an 
agency that they need new contingency plans, better 
surge capacity or that their mutual aid relationships are 
performing poorly. Policies may be re-designed, new 
SOPs may be forthcoming and organisational memory 
may be enhanced as a consequence. Yet this does not 
guarantee that the history that propelled those lessons 
will be remembered. This poses a threat, particularly 
to procedures that are costly but not obviously related 
to an organisation’s core business. For this reason, risk 
and crisis management practices are often forgotten or 
wilfully abandoned simply because they are not regularly 
used and no one recalls the history that justified their 
creation (Stark and Head 2019).
This alerts us to the fact that organisational memory 
also resides in an organisation’s culture. Memory is not 
simply a tangible record of the past or a lesson that can 
be institutionalised procedurally. It is also organic, fluid 
and propagated through an organisation’s ‘storytelling’ 
(Linde 2009). It can be found in the stories that are told 
about an organisation’s creation, its traditions and its 
successes and failures (Boje 2008; Bevir and Rhodes 
2010) and in organisational values and symbols that 
memorialise or curate the past (Edkins 2003). These 
cultural artefacts need not be organisationally specific. 
Consider, for example, the powerful mythology 
surrounding the concepts of neutrality and impartiality 
that pervade the humanitarian policy space. These values 
imbue the culture of most humanitarian organisations 
and have a curated history themselves, which is often 
told and retold in terms of a variety of historical events 
in which they were challenged or validated (for examples 
of both see Weiss 1999 and Terry 2002). When we 
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Institutional amnesia is a metaphor that can be used 
to describe how individuals, organisations and inter-
organisational networks no longer recall lessons from 
the past that could help them perform tasks in the 
present. Around the world, public sector leaders have 
begun to identify memory-loss as a fundamental issue 
that undermines their attempts to learn about, design 
and deliver public policies (Stark 2018). In response, 
an amnesia-orientated research agenda has recently 
emerged within public policy and public administration 
scholarship (Corbett et al. 2018; Stark 2019; Stark and 
Head 2019). That agenda complements pre-existing 
research about institutional memory, which is most 
commonly produced in psychology (Wright and Gaskell 
1995; Baddeley 2007; Kliegel et al. 2008), organisational 
studies (Walsh and Ungson 1991; Linde 2009; March 2010) 
and the social sciences (Connerton 1989; Halbwachs 
1992; Misztal 2003).
Despite the widespread acknowledgement of the 
importance of memory-loss in these works, little effort 
has been made to properly understand the effects of 
institutional amnesia in relation to disaster management 
generally and humanitarian agencies specifically. This 
paper addresses these research gaps by:
• Exploring who and what ‘forgets’ in terms of 
disaster management and the various dimensions 
of memory-loss;
• Defining the causes of institutional amnesia in relation 
to the humanitarian policy space;
• Establishing the effects of amnesia within disasters, 
across disasters and in the humanitarian sector 
more widely;
• Proposing a series of practitioner-orientated 
recommendations about how problematic forms of 
amnesia might be addressed.
The key message for researchers and practitioners is 
that institutional amnesia undermines lesson-learning 
gains. This simple point — that institutional amnesia 
robs organisations of their learned-lessons — is the 
single biggest reason why memory-loss must be given 
a higher priority within humanitarian agencies. The first 
step towards achieving this is to initially recognise the 
importance of amnesia and, thereafter, bring memory 
retention practices into our lesson-learning. We can 
begin to do this by defining its nature and its effects.
What is Institutional Amnesia?
A simple of way of understanding amnesia is to think 
about how and where memory is retained. The most 
obvious way is through the memory of individuals with 
experience. Institutional amnesia is therefore created 
when experienced individuals, who have learned their 
own lessons via participating in disaster management 
activities, leave their professional environment and take 
their memories with them.
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think about institutional amnesia from this view it will 
therefore reflect an absence of cultural processes and 
artefacts that interpret the past.
Memory can also reside across organisations in networks 
(Corbett et al. 2018). Transformations in the nature of 
disaster management over the past three decades have 
translated it from a state-centric and hierarchical affair 
to something which demands much more network 
governance (Stark 2014). In this context, memory can 
be shared across many different inter-connected 
actors. There are (at least) two dimensions to inter-
organisational memory of this nature. The first relates 
to the memory that is created via repeated interactions 
across time when different organisations need to come 
together to perform tasks. Repeated interactions of this 
nature lead to the creation of formal and informal inter-
organisational forums and shared forms of storytelling 
(Corbett et al. 2018). A simple example here comes via the 
coordination mechanisms that are used to respond to 
emergencies and disaster, which are often held together 
via informal and organic relationships that have been 
built over time (Moynihan 2008). A second dimension 
of network memory relates to ‘external memory’, 
which is held beyond an organisation’s borders. For 
example, Stark (2018) has made the case in relation to 
disease control, flood management and bushfire policy, 
that external actors who exist beyond the borders of 
government are a valuable commodity because of their 
capacity to hold onto crisis management lessons for 
longer periods. These types of organisation – in the 
form of professional associations, advocacy groups, 
research centres and think tanks, for example – are 
often lesser amnesiacs simply because they are shielded 
from the political impulse to continually reform.  These 
two types of memory show us that, from a network 
perspective, amnesia can be measured in a loss of inter-
organisational understanding and coherence.
What Causes Institutional Amnesia?
The single biggest cause of institutional amnesia is 
organisational ‘churn’ which is evidenced primarily 
through turnover in staff. Humanitarian NGOs suffer 
from significantly higher rates of turnover than other 
not-for-profit actors (Korf et al. 2015).  Turnover is 
caused by many factors, the single largest of which is 
undoubtedly funding continuity, which encourages 
short-term contracting in all NGOs (Richardson 
2006; Korf et al. 2015). However, there is more to the 
turnover issue than staffing costs. For example, should a 
humanitarian agency wish to keep its staff for more than 
one crisis deployment, they will often find themselves 
up against a widespread perception that humanitarian 
work, particularly in emergencies, is a one-off for the CV 
rather than something to be pursued across the longer-
term. Doctors, for example, often view their involvement 
in an international emergency response as something to 
be done once, either as a form of volunteering or as a 
one-off episode in their training, rather than something 
that represents a permanent career choice (Henry 
2004). This perception is often compounded by the lack 
of meaningful career pathways for professionals and 
the (relatively) low wages in the humanitarian sector 
(Richardson 2006; Telford and Cosgrave 2007). High 
levels of turnover can also be attributed to the nature 
of the job itself: long absences away from home, the 
insecurity of disaster zones and the trauma that can be 
experienced within them can all influence an individual’s 
willingness to participate in multiple deployments. For 
these reasons, humanitarian workers with partners and 
families are less likely to remain within an NGO for long 
enough to experience more than one disaster (Korf et 
al. 2015). Thus, what we see is a variety of structural, 
organisational and personal issues combining to run 
against the grain of long-term employment and memory 
retention in the sector.
However, churn can also be created intentionally. Short-
term contracts, it has been argued, can be beneficial 
to a humanitarian organisation as a means of creating 
adaptive capacity in crisis responses (Korf et al. 2015). 
The need to quickly ramp up a relief effort, to adapt it to 
circumstance and to then de-scale it as events change 
may demand human resource strategies that are highly 
flexible. Moreover, it can also been argued that short-
term contracts allow for a form of sectoral learning, 
which is created by staff moving across agencies, 
jurisdictions and roles but not leaving humanitarian 
work entirely.
Churn is also side effect of the ceaseless political need 
to be seen reforming policy, restructuring organisations 
and showing change (Pollitt 2000). This political impulse 
is universal to all policy areas and disaster management 
is no exception. Indeed, the problem is particularly 
pronounced in multi-level systems of governance, 
such as that which structures Disaster Risk Reduction 
internationally, that have a division of labour between 
policy formulation and policy implementation. In such 
systems, there is a tendency for the centre to ceaselessly 
create policy regardless of the capacity of local units 
to implement it. Continual upheaval of this nature can 
encourage churn in policy ideas, frameworks for action 
and institutional apparatus which all create a form of 
amnesia as policy operates without clear beginnings 
or ends and exists in a perpetual limbo. In this context, 
actors on the ground can wilfully ‘forget’ initiatives 
imposed from above. This is often an organisational 
coping strategy that allows front-line actors to ignore 
what they cannot do in order to focus on what they can 
(Stark 2018).
A variety of other dynamics can also erode memory. One 
interesting argument suggests that we create amnesia 
by neglecting to use history in lesson-learning efforts. 
At least three versions of this neglect are recorded in 
crisis management research. One relates to the way in 
which crises are viewed as exceptional, which leads to an 
underappreciation of the value of learning from history 
(Terry 2002). There is a tendency, well documented in 
studies of crises and hindsight learning, to view crises 
as one-offs that could not be foreseen and will not be 
repeated (Boin and Fischbacher-Smith 2011; Hindmoor 
and McConnell 2013). This tendency sits comfortably 
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with views about the contemporary nature of crises 
more generally, which emphasise the contemporary 
disaster as a unique manifestation of the highly 
uncertain times in which we live (Beck 1992). Complex 
emergencies are one label that has been used to define 
crises in these ways (for example, Natsios 1995). Yet 
when we look at complex emergencies, they actually 
reflect enduring problems that have not changed much 
across the years (Terry 2002). Consequently, we should 
not see them as exceptional or abnormal events which 
are characterised by unique forms of complexity but 
rather as more typical threats which can be understood 
through history (Terry 2002).
The neglect of history can also be a consequence of a 
wilful disinterest in learning about the past. This may 
be because confronting the past will challenge powerful 
interests, involve reforming the status quo or, more 
commonly, create political problems for incumbents and 
contemporary policies (Stark 2019). Thus, amnesia can 
be created through a simple unwillingness to interrogate 
the past because that means challenging dominant 
norms in the present. An illustrative example of this can 
be seen in the ways in which humanitarian aid continues 
to be militarised by governments in the global north. 
This is because of a continuing belief that aid is a policy 
tool for ensuring security. Continuity in this regard, 
Barakat et al. (2010) argue, reflects a willful tradition of 
the north deliberately ignoring the many failures that 
expose the lack of connection between humanitarian 
aid, the pacification of domestic communities and the 
creation of security.
A final category worth noting under the wilful neglect 
of history relates to the positive nature of institutional 
amnesia as a means of overcoming trauma. For example, 
trauma-inducing disasters can create ‘long shadow 
crises’ (‘t Hart and Boin 2001). This description captures 
how acute emergencies shape-shift into political crises. 
Long-shadow crises are often driven by those who 
suffered trauma as they constantly relive the past in ways 
which will not allow them to move on. For these groups, 
the political struggle is endless because they cannot 
put distance between themselves, the disaster and their 
trauma. Efforts to produce accountability, redress and 
compensation after disasters will never be enough for 
these groups because ‘those who make politics out of 
pursuing such claims make themselves, and those they 
charge, slaves to what cannot be changed’ (Olick and 
Demetriou 2006: 77). Although many traumatic events 
are met with a response that emphasises that ‘we 
will remember’, the debilitating effects of trauma and 
resentment can actually mean that some amnesia can 
help, simply because ‘memory breathes revenge as often 
as it breathes reconciliation’ (Assmann 1999: 15).
The Effects of Institutional Amnesia
Amnesia can create problematic effects within disaster 
responses, across disasters and in the humanitarian 
aid sector more broadly. Within disasters, the single 
largest problem emerges from the handover process 
through which staff replace each other. As staff rotate, 
memory of the emergency effort can be lost, and the 
wheel is reinvented both in terms of strategic decision 
making and operational actions (Richardson 2006; 
Telford and Cosgrave 2007). Typically, handovers occur 
as emergency relief begins to give way to longer term 
recovery and development. As handovers happen in a 
crisis, memory of the needs of those affected, memory 
of the ad-hoc responses to the challenges of the 
emergency (some successful, others failed) and memory 
of the temporary relationships created on the front-line 
can all be lost. This may be because no systems are in 
place to bridge the gap. Alternatively, incoming staff 
(especially medical professionals) may orientate towards 
a form of ‘learning by doing’ which demands trial and 
error working at a personal level. Thus, the wheel (even 
if broken) is reinvented again and again across the life 
of an emergency response. Consider, for example, the 
account below, which many front-line humanitarian 
actors will recognise as familiar. It comes from the 
reconstruction of a ‘day in the life’ of a nurse on a 
Médecins Sans Frontières emergency project:
First, she works alongside the newly arrived doctor. 
She has noticed that this doctor does not want to 
listen to anything about how his predecessors did 
the job; he wants to do it his own way and to find 
things out by himself. For Anna this is an inefficient 
‘learning-by-doing’ approach that fails to take into 
consideration the experiences of others. With the high 
staff turnover in this emergency project, knowledge 
just slips away. (Hilhorst and Schmiemann 2002: 495, 
emphasis added)
A second issue created by amnesia relates to the 
lack of skills within a relief effort. When churn limits 
the number of individuals and organisations with 
experience of previous crises, mistakes can be made. 
This is particularly true in relation to large-scale events 
that require surge capacity. When humanitarian NGOs 
attempt to ‘ramp-up’ in order to address the very 
largest and most disastrous events, they often need 
to staff relief responses with people who have little 
experience. Well-known problems in the response to 
the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, for example, have been 
attributed to the inexperience of NGO workers (Telford 
and Cosgrave 2007). Issues including fraud, excessively 
paternalistic forms of aid, a lack of local empowerment 
and the overuse of an asset-driven approach to relief, 
for example, have all been associated with the drafting 
in of inexperienced humanitarian workers to that crisis. 
However, issues of that nature are by no means confined 
to that example. They need to be understood as a 
long-running feature of humanitarian responses more 
generally that have been well-recognised for some time 
(other examples can be found in Hicks and Pappas 2006 
and Loquercio et al. 2006).
Amnesia also undermines trust in relationships. This 
is an important issue in relation to several areas of 
a crisis response. In strict operational terms, supply 
chains can suffer due to amnesia. Logistics research has 
shown how constant turnover within a crisis response 
can undermine the trust that is required to build swift 
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supply lines in contexts of uncertainty (Tomasini and 
Van Wassenhove 2009; Tatham and Kovacs 2010; 
Dubey et al. 2016). Capacity building, participation and 
empowerment at the local level can also suffer because 
of amnesia-driven mistrust. The cosmetic nature of 
a great deal of participatory approaches to disaster 
management is now well-known (see, for example, Clarke 
et al. 2010). Local capacity building efforts, however, 
become even harder when staff turnover exacerbates 
power-sharing differences (Rothe 2012). Moreover, in 
certain regards, the lack of experienced staff in INGOs 
can undermine the capacity of local NGOs. The failure 
to include and empower grassroots development 
agencies in international disaster responses is a well-
known problem (see, for example, Stumpenhorst et 
al. 2011). In certain crisis responses, the experience of 
local staff, which will be underscored by the lack of 
experience in INGOs, can mean that they are ‘poached’ 
by international actors (Telford and Cosgrave 2007). 
While this may empower the individual and, potentially, 
enhance the context-sensitivity of a crisis response, it 
can also create memory-loss at the local level.
The effects of amnesia within a disaster response 
are compounded by its effects across disasters. The 
fundamental issue here is the way in which institutional 
memory-loss affects formal lesson-learning efforts. 
When it comes to lesson-learning, the default position 
of most researchers is that a great deal of learning 
from crises fails to reform policy and organisations 
successfully (for a very small sample see, Perrow 2007; 
Elliott 2009; Drennan et al. 2015; Eburn and Dovers 
2015). This position allows crisis researchers to explain 
long-running patterns in the causes of crises, in the 
ways in which they go undetected, and in the ways in 
which they are mishandled. However, when we place 
the concept of amnesia into these views it opens up an 
alternative explanation as to why we see problematic 
repetitions of past problems. It may not always be the 
case that governments are failing to learn but rather that 
amnesia is undermining learning efforts (Stark 2018).
There are two dimensions to this problem. The first 
relates to the quality of lessons which can be affected 
by the recycling of old ideas (Pollitt 2009). When old 
solutions, which have tried and failed, are forgotten about 
they can remerge as something new only to fail again. 
Thus cyclical problems continue. The continual waxing 
and waning of centralisation versus decentralisation 
as principles that ought to structure crisis response 
frameworks is a good example here. However, disaster 
management literature is replete with examples of poorly 
performing policies being continued. Barakat et al (2010: 
5310), for example, discuss the constant use of Quick 
Impact Projects (QIPs) and ‘self-help’ projects in conflict 
zones. Rather than generating legitimacy and support 
both kinds of project tend to ‘instil a sense of pessimism 
among beneficiary populations that broader and more 
meaningful improvements in economic conditions may 
never arrive’. However, despite this failure, variations of 
these projects continue to be used. Thus, ‘the cyclical 
resurrection of previously problematic paradigms may 
be viewed as a failure of institutional learning’ (Barakat 
et al. 2010: 5297).
A second, more straightforward aspect to the amnesia-
learning relationship relates to the erosion of lessons 
across time (for example, see Colten and Sumpter 2009). 
For this reason, successful learning may rest upon 
the creation of what psychologists’ call ‘prospective 
memory’. This is when knowledge is stored in a way 
that is not used in the present or the everyday yet 
remains available for performing tasks in the future 
(McDaniel and Einstein 2007; Kliegel et al. 2008). Thus, 
the challenge for post-crisis learning is to find ways to 
institutionalise lessons so that they can be shared across 
time so that when the next crisis arrives, prospective 
memory can be put into practice. This challenge takes 
us to a discussion of how we might address amnesia.
How Can We Cure Amnesia?
There are two caveats worth noting before prescriptions 
for remedying amnesia can be proposed. First, it 
is almost impossible to foresee a future in which 
institutional amnesia can be completely cured. We 
therefore need to resist the urge to demand the 
impossible because, quite simply, some of the causes of 
amnesia are simply too big to fix. It is highly unlikely, 
for example, that humanitarian NGOs, are going to be 
able to find the levels of continuous donor funding that 
will transform the sector into an attractive job market 
with high levels of pay, enduring job security and many 
career opportunities. For the same reason, the reliance 
of NGOs on short-term contracts is also here to stay. 
The urge to instigate reform amongst politicians and 
organisational leaders is also unlikely to dampen any 
time soon as reform is always more attractive than 
inaction. Similarly, at the individual level, the view 
that participating in an emergency relief effort is a 
one-off voluntary endeavour will also remain despite 
the ever-increasing professionalisation of the sector. 
Finally, the massive personal challenges of working in 
a disaster zone means that continual turnover within a 
crisis response is inevitable. Therefore, the structural, 
organisational and personal causes of churn, and their 
amnesia inducing effects, are here to stay.
The second caveat that needs to precede any 
recommendations in this area is that certain kinds of 
amnesia can be beneficial and should not be treated 
as a problem. Forgetting the past is a necessary part 
of changing policies and practices that do not work (de 
Holan 2011). An over-reliance on history in decision-
making can stifle creativity (Weick 1988) and amnesia 
can be a means of ameliorating traumatic institutional 
memories (Bell 2006). Therefore, an agenda that sets 
out to reduce amnesia needs to first ask what memories 
need to be recalled, which ones are best forgotten 
and how a balance can be struck between both these 
positions in a specific context. Despite these caveats, 
humanitarian agencies might consider several ways in 
which they could go about improving their memory.
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1. Introduce Memory Work into 
Lesson-Learning.
Knowledge retention and knowledge recall 
measures can ensure learned lessons are more 
likely to have a prospective impact.
One method for achieving knowledge retention 
is to designate a specific monitor to oversee the 
implementation and the ongoing use of learned lessons. 
Innovative forms of public inquiry conducted in Australia 
and beyond, for example, have shown how the creation 
of independent monitors have kept recommendations 
alive over a period of years (Stark 2018). Ideally, these 
kinds of lesson-learning watchdogs would be external, 
independent and have the capacity to conduct their 
own research. A good Australian example can be found 
in the Bushfires Royal Commission Independent Monitor 
who over a five-year period following the Black Saturday 
Bushfires published a series of reports about the ongoing 
implementation of the Royal Commission’s reform 
agenda. This ensured that the lessons remained on the 
agenda years after the Commission finished reporting. 
While this is a good example of an external knowledge 
recall mechanism, there is nothing that precludes an 
internal unit or even a singular member of staff from 
performing this role if given the proper capacity. 
A second means of recalling lessons-learned relates to 
memorialisation, which is one means through which 
cultural forms of remembering can take place. Occasions 
which remember the victims and the survivors of 
disaster also offer an opportunity to recall specific 
lessons from that event. Regardless, of the specifics, 
the key message remains that lesson-learning without 
memory is meaningless.
2. Take Record-Keeping Seriously.
Develop archival processes that not only 
record organisational history in detail but can 
be easily accessed and disseminated. View 
record-keeping as a means of lesson-learning.
The easiest way to take record-keeping seriously is to 
appoint a historian as an archivist, which is a tactic that 
some government departments have turned to after 
years of neglecting their record-keeping. This move was 
a result of the realisation that old ideas that had already 
failed were being recycled and presented as new and 
that a public historian, backed by a departmental library, 
could detect such trends and deliver policy advice that 
might warn decision-makers about the dangers of 
repeating history (Szreter 2011). However, as a minimum, 
better record-keeping means finding a way to store 
lessons so that they can be accessed easily. A key part 
of this is regarding the narratives and recording the 
nuance of past events and their relationships to reforms, 
procedures and behaviours. In this way, the ‘why’ behind 
business-as-usual can be explained. Finally, record-
keeping ought to extend into the uncertainty of the 
emergency relief phase when possible. There is no doubt 
that those in the thick of a disaster zone are not going to 
prioritise the historical record when taking decisions. In 
fact, they may be uncomfortable with it at a fundamental 
level because of the shadow of post-crisis accountability 
and censure. However, by allocating specific resources 
to record-keeping, hard won experiences about what 
works in the heat of a disaster can be preserved across 
staff rotations. This is enough of a reason to at least 
trial the use of professional record-keepers in a crisis 
response. Ethnographers with disaster experience, for 
example, would be particularly useful in this regard.
3. Use External Memory.
Scope out and connect with external 
organisations who have expertise. Specialists 
that operate outside of fast-churning sectors 
can be a valuable repository of memory.
For many government agencies, NGOs can act as a form 
of external memory. This is because they are relatively 
stable in their policy focus and because their core 
advocacy messages tend to remain consistent over 
time. However, there is nothing to suggest that NGOs 
themselves cannot draw on external memory in the same 
way. The most obvious example is the research centre. 
Although they are also subject to the whims of external 
funding, long-running centres will have significant levels 
of institutional memory. Indeed, specialisation and 
expertise within an organisation is often an indicator of 
the likelihood of strong memory (Stark 2019). However, 
other bodies also have untapped stores of external 
memory. Trade unions and professional associations, 
for example, are often stable organisations with well-
recorded histories and long-serving staff that will be 
able to recall sectoral trends. 
The most compelling source of external memory is to be 
found in local capacities. Cultivating national platforms, 
local NGOs and indigenous participatory institutions 
around the world, for example, means supporting 
them to record and share their histories as a means 
of memory building. This agenda also contributes to 
an empowering form of development. Humanitarian 
agencies should therefore scan their networks, seek out 
external memory and build relationships in ways that 
could allow it to be tapped.
4. Increase Storytelling.
Stories of success and failure can propagate 
lessons across time and bridge the gap 
between outgoing and ingoing staff. Effort 
should be made to tell historical lessons as part 
of induction and basic training.
When thinking about enhancing memory, most 
organisations opt for the formal-institutional route. This 
means attempting to retain staff and embed lessons into 
formal procedures. However, storytelling is a crucial 
but neglected dimension of memory building that is 
easy to do, cost-efficient and can offer real returns. 
Organisations simply do not do it as they are too focused 
on daily business. However, perpetuating stories from 
the past, which teach new and existing actors about 
organisational history, can be something that is woven 
into business-as-usual practices. A simple means, for 
example, would be to include history in staff inductions 
and forms of basic training. Ethnographic organisational 
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research tells us that newly arrived leaders often adopt 
and then quickly invoke stories from their organisation’s 
past as a means of legitimising themselves (Linde 2009). 
This is one way in which memory passes over from old 
leaders to new incumbents. This type of appropriation 
could be extended to all staff via training processes.
5. Use Coordination Mechanisms for 
Knowledge Transfer.
Coordination mechanisms are a constant 
feature of disasters and can be used as a 
short-term repository for historical knowledge.
Whether it’s the cluster framework at the international 
level or a domestic coordination framework like AIIMS 
or ICS, their purpose is to coordinate by centralising 
knowledge across a variety of different actors. This 
means that coordination mechanisms are a means of 
knowledge transfer across time. Moreover, coordination 
frameworks are a constant feature in disasters and 
remain while staff come and go. This means that they 
have the potential to reduce the memory-loss that occurs 
through staff handovers. Ideally, this responsibility 
should be given to the ‘logistics’ team within the 
coordination framework. Logistics capacities are a 
generic feature of most coordination frameworks, they 
are typically responsible for information management 
and logistics research has addressed issues of memory 
and memory-loss. Logistics teams could therefore take 
carriage of a record-keeping responsibility, which would 
then be used during handover periods. Of course, the 
assumption being made here is that humanitarian actors 
will be engaging with inter-organisational coordination 
mechanisms, which is not always a given.
Conclusion
It is time for those who prepare and respond to 
humanitarian crises to start taking institutional amnesia 
seriously. It can be the cause of lesson-learning failures, 
it can undermine the quality of emergency decision-
making and operational processes, and it can fuel 
problematic forms of post-crisis politics. Ultimately, 
however, the single biggest reason why humanitarian 
agencies need to recognise memory-loss is because it 
is the dynamic which ensures that problematic pasts, 
which are registered in the causes of disasters and the 
issues that lead to their mishandling, return again and 
again to haunt humanitarian responses.
When amnesia is ignored misdiagnoses occur and 
reforms miss the mark. We tell ourselves that we can 
fix cyclical problems by remedying how we learn, 
or by getting to grips with coordination failures or 
by increasing the use of evidence and research in 
planning efforts. These are all worthy endeavours, 
which will certainly improve disaster management 
efforts, but they are meaningless if they are forgotten 
because of the individual, organisational and network 
dynamics discussed above. If we really want to treat the 
pathologies that have created long-running problems in 
humanitarian responses to crises, we will need to work 
out how to remember them across time.
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